Introduction
• Regime types have opposing influences on terrorism  Encourage terrorism by facilitating its practice in democracies through freedoms and constraints on the executive branch  Discourage terrorism by allowing for participation and voices to be heard  Regimes that value constituents' lives and property will act to limit attacks
• Literature results are rather mixed
Purposes
• The paper provides a game-theoretic model that captures strategic, political access, and other influences
• This model suggests that these opposing drivers give rise to an inverted U-shaped relationship between regime type and terrorism wherein some middle range of anocracy is most conducive to terrorism.  Regime type is a normalized Polity 2 score that varies from 0 (full autocracy) to 1 (full democracy).
• Apply myriad empirical tests -e.g., random-effects panel, cross-sectional, country fixedeffects panels, and instrumental variable approach -to establish that regime type has an extremely robust inverted U-shaped relationship to terrorism.
• Apply to domestic and transnational terrorism -venue or perpetrator origin
• Break regime into components -political participation and executive constraints. Also holds for political rights.
• Investigate influence of foreign policy variables (i.e., US alliance, Intervention, and International Crisis)
Brief Literature Review
• Strategic school argues that democracies facilitate terrorism by reducing its marginal cost to perpetrators by allowing freedom of association, freedom of movement, protection of civil liberties, access to potential targets, and rights to due process (Eyerman, 1998; Schmid, 1992; Wilkinson, 1986 ). This implies that democracy is a positive influence on terrorism.
• Political access school views democracies as best able to assuage grievances by fostering greater political participation by a wide segment of society (Eyerman, 1998; Li, 2005) . This implies democracy is a negative influence on terrorism.
• Protection of constituents' right in liberal democracies will be a negative terrorism. Strong counterterrorism actions will be a negative influence on terrorism in autocracies. • Two-player (terrorist group and targeted government) game with both players moving simultaneously.
• Same influences on

Terrorists:
utility increases at a diminishing rate democratic principles denoted by , so that costs increase at an increasing rate with attacks, a, and counterterrorism, e. and -producing freedoms and executive constraints foster a more favorable attack environment FOC: negative-sloped reaction path. 
Theory 3
• greater democratic values implies more counterterrorism.
• Explain Figure 1 -Nash equilibrium and changes in
• With full autocracy, there is little terrorism as governments respond with strong countermeasures.
• With full democracy, political access school and protection of lives and property dominate so that there should be little terrorism.
• Most terrorism where strategic school dominants political access and poor protection of lives and properties as in anocracies. consisting 159 countries for nine time periods: 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009 
Results 3
• Table 3 -how foreign policy variables' influence disappears when we use fixed effect (FENB) rather than pooled NB.
• Regime inverted U-shaped relationship remains
Robustness
• 
Further Robustness
• Autocracy and Democracy with anocracy as the missing type in Table 6 • Freedom House Political Rights (no endogeneity)
• Political Participation
• Executive Constraint
• Main findings are generally confirmed • Use external instrument of waves of regional change in regime type.  Neighboring regime changes spillover to other countries in the region, but they have no direct impact on a country's terrorism for excludability condition to hold.
• Pooled Poisson instrumental variable regression using the control function method.
• Instrument is correlated with the endogenous variable and instrument is strong. 
Concluding remarks
